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et al.: Takings Clause

TAKINGS CLAUSE
N.Y. CONST.artI, § 7(a):
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

COURT OF APPEALS
Saratoga Water Services, Inc. v. Saratoga County Water
172
Authority3
(decided February 22, 1994)

Petitioner, Saratoga Water Services, Inc., and two individual
property owners, initiated a proceeding under the Eminent
Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) section 2073173 and claimed that
Public Authorities Law section 1199-eee(5) 3 17 4 violated the state
3172. 1994 WL 50154 (Feb. 22, 1994).
3173. N.Y. EM. DOM. PRoc. LAw § 207 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1994).
Section 207 provides in part: "Any person or persons jointly or severally,
aggrieved by the condemnor's determination and findings made pursuant to this
article, may seek judicial review thereof by the appellate division of the
supreme court...." Id.
3174. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1199-eee(5) (McKinney 1994). Section
1199-eee(5) provides in part:
Except as otherwise limited by this title, the authority shall have the
power:
To acquire... by condemnation pursuant to the eminent domain
procedure law ...any real or personal property or interest therein,

within or without the district, as the authority may deem necessary,
convenient or desirable to carry out the purpose of this title and to pay
the costs thereof;....Provided, however, notwithstanding any
provision of the eminent domain procedure law to the contrary, in any
proceeding brought by the authority... and compensation shall be paid
only upon (a) a decision by the supreme court that compensation for real
property condemned shall be determined solely by the income
capitalization method of valuation based on actual net income as allowed
by the public service commission, and (b) such supreme court's
determination that the amount of such compensation shall be based on
the income capitalization method, entry of a final judgment, the filing of
the final decree and the conclusion of any appeal or the expiration of the
time to file an appeal related to the condemnation proceeding. If any
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constitution 3 175 by "unconstitutionally divest[ing] the Judiciary of
its power to determine just compensation." 3 17 6 Petitioners further
argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 3 177 The
court held the statute constitutional on two grounds. First, the
statute did not work to divest the supreme court of its power to
determine the method of compensation to be employed when
private property was appropriated for public use. 3 178 Second, the
court held the statute was not void for vagueness because the
supreme court's valuation of the property acquired under eminent
domain occurs "as of the time of the taking."3179
Respondents, Saratoga County Water Authority, issued notices
of a public hearing to be held in April 1992 for purposes of
informing the public that it was considering acquiring a portion
of petitioners' property and assets through condemnation. 3 180
After the public hearing, respondent issued two "determination
and findings" statements which proclaimed that acquisition of
petitioners' property was necessary to operate a water system for
the town of Malta. 3 18 1 The "determination and findings"
statements also announced that acquisition of petitioners'
property would aid in the development of a "[c]ounty-wide
coordinated public water system."3182 Petitioners, Saratoga
court shall utilize any method of compensation other than the income
capitalization method, or if the proposed compensation is more than the
rate base of the assets taken in condemnation, as utilized by the public
service commission in setting rates and as certified by such commission,
then the authority may withdraw the condemnation proceeding without
prejudice or costs to any party ....
Id.

3175. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 7(a) ("Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation."); see also N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW

§ 512 (McKinney 1979). Section 512 provides in pertinent part: "The
court .... shall determine the compensation due the condemnees for damages
as the result of the acquisition." Id.

3176. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *1.
3177.
3178.
3179.
3180.
3181.
3182.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
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Water Services, Inc., a domestic corporation providing water "to
approximately 1350 customers,... and two individual property
owners," challenged respondent's findings in a proceeding

instituted by them in the appellate division. 3 183

In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court noted
the inherent difficulty in valuating the property of the corporate

petitioner, a public utility. 3 184 One difficulty, explained the
court, is the absence of sales of public utilities. 3 185 Further,
valuation problems arise because, in addition to the physical
property, the condemnor also acquires a "going business
enterprise." 3 186 Various valuation methods, market value, 3 18 7
replacement or reproduction less depreciation, 3 18 8 and income

capitalization, 3189 the court opined, were unsatisfactory in
3 19 0
resolving this dilemma.

3183. Id.
3184. Id.
3185. Id.; see also Onondaga County Water Auth. v New York Water Serv.
Corp., 285 A.D. 655, 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d 755, 762 (4th Dep't 1955) ("The
absence of sales of similar [utility] property is one difficulty.").
3186. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *1.
3187. Market value "is calculated by reference to comparable sales between
willing buyers and sellers .... " Id.; See Onondaga County Water Auth, 285
A.D. at 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (noting that the absence of a market for sale
of public utilities renders market value approach unworkable).
3188. The cost of reproduction method has been described as "the cost which
will necessarily be incurred by a reasonably prudent and careful man using
ordinary careful business methods in reproducing a plant of equal efficiency."
4A NICHOLS', THE LAW OF EamENT DOMAIN § 15.41[3] (3d ed. rev. 1993).
See also Onondaga, 285 A.D. at 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (stating that
reproduction less depreciation method cannot be used as an exclusive measure
of valuation because it accounts neither for intangible factors nor for "what
might well be a great disparity between earnings of a utility and replacement of
physical assets").
3189. The income capitalization approach:
[Sleeks to determine how much a buyer would pay for the right to
receive future cash flows. The evidence necessary in such an approach
include [sic] the following: provable past earnings on a periodic basis,
growth rate in use fees, projected cost increases, new users projected
and governmental restrictions on regulations capping expansion of
earnings.
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The court confirmed the respondent's determinations and
findings, reasoning that Public Authorities Law section 1199eee(5) served a dual purpose. It afforded a property owner

protection by permitting the supreme court to utilize other
methods besides income capitalization in computing just
compensation. 3 191 Further, it allowed the condemnor "an avenue
of escape" should a valuation of condemned property be
unusually high. 3 192 Thus, the dual purpose, "while unusual," did
3193
not render the statute unconstitutional.
Regarding the Saratoga petitioners' first contention that "PAL
section 1199-eee(5) impermissibly mandates exclusive use of the
income capitalization method ... and that such a legislative
command effectively usurps the power to determine just

compensation

designated

to

the Judiciary

by the

State

Constitution, "3194 the court noted that legislative enactments are

presumptively constitutional, and that one attacking a legislative
enactment must "'bear the burden of demonstrating
[unconstitutionality] beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3 195 The court
construed the statute as merely implying a preference for the

income

capitalization

method,

and not as a

legislative

5 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 19.0711] (3d ed. rev. 1993); see

also Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *1 (stating that income capitalization
approach "remains subject to criticism, principally because of the speculative
nature of the valuation criteria used, and because earned income imperfectly
reflects the actual value of a utility whose rates are subject to regulation")
(citations omitted); Onondaga, 285 A.D. at 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (quoting
Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328 (1893)
("'The value of the property... is determined by its productiveness, the
profits which its use brings to the owner ....

The value, therefore, is not

determined by the mere cost of construction, but more by what the completed
structure brings in the way of earning to its owner.'").
3190. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *1.
3191.
3192.
3193.
3194.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1979).

3195. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *2 (quoting Alliance of Am. Insurers v.
Chu, 71 N.Y.2d 573, 585, 571 N.E.2d 672, 678, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364, 370
(1991)).
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mandate. 3 196 This conclusion was compelled by the language

employed in the last sentence of the statute, which allows the
condemnor to withdraw from the condemnation proceeding if the

court employed a valuation method other than that of income
capitalization. 3 197 Finally, the court stated that the statute at issue
was similar to the Onondaga statute which the court in that case
held constitutional. 3 19 8

The statute at issue in Onondaga was section 5-a of the
Condemnation Law, and its amendments, which required the

Public Service Commission to certify: "(1) the annual net
earnings which the utility system involved might reasonably be

expected to continue to produce in the hands of the condemnee;
and (2) the rate base and rate of return from which that estimate

is derived." 3 199 The commissioners of appraisal were required to

wait until thirty days after the certificate was served before
determining the compensation to be paid to the owners of the
condemned property, and further were required to appraise the

3196. Id. at *2.
3197. Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw § 1199-eee(5) (McKinney 1994)).
The Saratoga court also reviewed the legislative history of the statute in
reaching its determination, and concluded that the legislative history supported
its interpretation. Id. at *2-*3. However, the language used in both the
Legislative Memorandum and the Governor's Memorandum appear contrary to
the court's interpretation. The Legislative Memorandum provides in part:
"This bill would ensure that the capitalization method be used by the
court .... Should the condemnation court or any appellate court determine
that the income capitalization method is not appropriate, the bill provides that
title to the company's assets will not transferand the condemnationproceeding
will be withdrawn." 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 755, legislative memorandum, 2998
(emphasis added).
The governor's memorandum is similar in tone:
[The condemnation court will utilize the income capitalization method
in computing the amount of the condemnation award.... However, if
the condemnation court determines that the income capitalization method
is not appropriate, the bill provides that title to the company's assets will
not transfer and permits the [condemnor] to withdraw from the
condemnation proceeding.
1986 N.Y. LAWs ch. 755, Governor's Memorandum, 3195.
3198. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *2.
3199. Onondaga, 285 A.D. at 658-59, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
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property with "due regard" to the information contained in the
certificate. 3200 If the appraisal was either not in accord with the
certificate, or if the Public Service Commission determined that
the amount of compensation to be so high as not to be in the
public interest, the statute provided that the Public Service
Commission could petition the court to abandon and discontinue
the condemnation proceeding. 320 1
The Onondaga court held that there were no problems with the
constitutionality of the statute and its amendments. 320 2 Section 5a did not mandate that "the commissioners of appraisal
rigidly ...

adhere to the certification by the Public Service

Commission." 3203 Nor did the statute assign duties to the Public
Service Commission which usurped the powers of the court under
the constitution. 3204
As to the void for vagueness claim, the Saratoga court held
that even though title does not vest in the condemnor until the
appeals process is exhausted, the supreme court was not
"presently fixing the value of the property as of some
undetermined future date. "3205 Ordinarily, in a condemnation
proceeding, the condemnor's compensation is fixed as of the
moment title to the property vests in the condemnor. 3206
However, the statute at issue modified the general rule by
separating the "taking" from the condemnee, from the vesting of
title in the condemnor. 3207
Under the EDPL, a condemnor is in possession of the property
upon the filing of an acquisition map at the end of the acquisition
3200.
3201.
3202.
3203.

Id. at 658, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
Id. at 658-59, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
Id. at 660, 139 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
Id.

3204. Id. At issue in Onondaga was article 1, section 7 of the New York
Constitution.
3205. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *3.

3206. Id.; see also In re City of New York [Salvation Army], 43 N.Y.2d
512, 518, 373 N.E.2d 984, 987, 402 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (1978) ("[A]

condemnee is entitled to just compensation as of the instant its property is
taken by the vesting of title in the condemnor. It is as of that time that the
value is to be fixed .... ").
3207. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *3.
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proceeding. 3208 The value of the property is fixed as of that
date. 3209 Title, however, does not vest in the condemnor until
after the appeals process is concluded. 32 10 The later vesting
permits the condemnor to withdraw from the condemnation
proceeding if the income capitalization method is not employed
without violating the well-settled rule that a condemnor cannot
abandon property condemned after title vests. 32 11 Thus, since
valuation at the moment of the condemnor is in possession of the
property, the statute was held not to be unconstitutionally
vague.

3 2 12

Valuation of a public utilities present complex problems in
eminent domain proceedings. So long as a statute aids the court
in ascertaining the correct worth of the property and does not
abrogate any of the court's constitutional powers, the statute will
survive constitutional scrutiny.

3208. Id.
3209. Id.
3210. Id.

3211. Id. See 6 NICHOLS', THE LAW OF ErmINEN DOMAIN § 26.42[2] (3rd
ed. rev. 1993) ("The right to vest title in the condemnor and the right to
abandon and discontinue the proceeding after such vesting are mutually
exclusive rights. The courts have uniformly held that condemnation
proceedings cannot be discontinued after the condemnor has taken title.")
(citations omitted).
3212. Saratoga, 1994 WL 50154 at *3.
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